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Abstract 
Why do local governments engage in formal cooperative agreements to deliver 
municipal services?  What are the determinants of these collaborative efforts?  We review 
the literature on horizontal collaboration and intergovernmental relations developed by 
the political economy, public choice, institutional collective action, and network 
literatures and present a theoretical model that intertwines several arguments from these 
literatures.   
The theoretical model suggests that the decision to collaborate is a product of 
prior experiences of competition/cooperation between municipal governments, the 
incentives for efficiency gains derived from cooperation, and the institutional setting in 
which intergovernmental relations take place.  Based on this theoretical model and using 
a research design inspired by the literatures on international conflicts and coalition 
governments, we develop and test a series of hypotheses concerning the decision to 
cooperate by Portuguese municipal governments in face of recent decentralization trends.  
We find support for our trust and centrality hypotheses as incentives to cooperation, but 
fragmentation within local governments poses a constraint to collaborative efforts 
between municipalities.  
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Introduction 
During the past decade, Portugal has witnessed the expansion of new forms of 
local governance placing an increased emphasis on regional and inter-local cooperation.  
This new trend is indicated by the significant increase in voluntary formal agreements 
between municipal governments, resulting in the formation of municipal associations to 
perform the delivery of services at the regional level.  Many local governments have 
decided to participate in several of these associations, creating a true network of local 
government partnerships to respond to multiple service delivery goals. 
The political pressure exercised by the E.U. Stability and Growth Pact created a 
grip on public spending at the national level, originating the decentralization of 
expenditures without the corresponding access to revenue sources by local governments.  
These voluntary regional agreements are the product of this continuing trend of political 
decentralization and devolution of service delivery responsibilities from national to local 
governments. 
The common thread in these types of agreements is still largely unknown and the 
variable geographical boundaries involved require further investigation.  The goal of this 
article is to explore the size, composition, and scope of intergovernmental agreements 
between Portuguese local governments and to develop a research design that will allow 
testing hypotheses derived from the literature on intergovernmental cooperation.  Why do 
local governments cooperate?  In other words, what are the factors influencing the 
decision made by local officials to join a regional type of association or government?  
Hopefully, the ideas outlined can be extended to other European experiences in 
horizontal collaboration, allowing further understanding of common trends and main 
differences. 
After this brief introduction, we review the theoretical arguments presented in the 
literature to explain local intergovernmental cooperation.  In the fourth section we 
illustrate the Portuguese experience in further detail, underlining the recent context of 
devolution trends faced by Portuguese local governments.  Next, we describe and test a 
series of hypotheses based on a research design that borrows from the fields of 
international conflicts and coalition governments concerning the decision to cooperate by 
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Portuguese municipalities.  Finally, we conclude with a summary and discussion of our 
findings.  
Intermunicipal Cooperation: The State of the Art 
Intergovernmental cooperation can take several forms, depending on the type of 
agreement established between parties.  Intergovernmental contracts have been addressed 
in the literature as widely used forms of service delivery (Stein, 1990; Agranoff and 
McGuire, 1999), but the limits imposed by national legislation justify a closer look at the 
Portuguese experience.  LeRoux and Carr (2007) treat intergovernmental service 
contracts, joint service agreements, and intergovernmental service transfers as evidence 
of cooperation, but the Portuguese experience with intergovernmental agreements fits 
better with the joint service format, since local governments jointly plan, finance, and 
deliver specific services to all jurisdictions signing the agreement.  In fact, Portuguese 
joint service agreements are named municipal associations, and characterized by formal 
contracting, single-purpose ends, and freedom of association between governments.   
The literature on horizontal intergovernmental cooperation is characterized by 
mixed findings regarding the decision to collaborate.  Many factors are usually pointed 
out as facilitating or hindering cooperation, but comparative analysis shows that 
intergovernmental cooperation is largely the product of the particular political order 
where it takes place (Kantor, 2006).  In spite of these differences, we believe it is possible 
to find regularities across different economic and political settings that contribute to 
explain the decision to formally join a cooperative type of agreement.    
The Contribution from the Political Economy Literature 
The political economy model of intergovernmental cooperation argues that local 
actors analyze both economic and political costs and benefits when deciding to engage in 
cooperation for service delivery (Gerber and Gibson, 2005).  Among the factors that are 
likely to facilitate collaboration, economic efficiency is the most often cited (Stephens 
and Wikstrom, 2000; Post, 2004).  Economies of scale and specialization can be 
accomplished by arranging for regional service delivery of specific services, such as 
transportation, water supply, and solid waste collection and management.  
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Intergovernmental cooperation can generate tremendous cost savings, especially in 
capital-intensive projects, not only because larger producers can acquire materials and 
infrastructures at lower cost, but also because the increase in population size allows a 
reduction in average costs.  Labour-intensive services are less likely to require or 
engender regional cooperation among local governments in metropolitan area settings 
(Post, 2004). 
The political economy argument is also based on the idea that externalities 
between neighbouring jurisdictions lead to cooperative actions in search of economic 
efficiency (Gerber and Gibson 2005).  Individually, some local initiatives generate 
negative externalities detrimental to the economic welfare of the region, but a regional 
approach, either through formal contracts, informal agreements or metropolitan 
partnerships, produces added gains.  Regional action can also produce positive 
externalities for all the participants in interlocal contracts and agreements.  The goal of 
these policies is developmental and, while they may favour some localities more than 
others, the region as a whole will be better off (Gerber and Gibson, 2005). 
Related to economic efficiency arguments, the size of local jurisdictions is 
frequently stated as an obstacle in dealing with the increasing numbers of policies and 
programmes delegated from national governments to the regional and local levels.  Pierre 
and Peters (2000) argue that when national bureaucracies became too rigid to deliver 
services effectively, devolution to local governments was the logical response.  However, 
in many cases, municipalities still lack adequate financial and professional capacity to 
respond to citizen demands.  Hence, the search for financial and technical expertise has 
been mentioned as a driving force for intergovernmental cooperation, particularly in rural 
and economically depressed communities (Lackey, Freshwater, and Rupasingha, 2002).  
In Europe, joint service provision agreements are regarded as an alternative to improve 
efficiency without relinquishing local autonomy through mergers or consolidation of 
local governments (Laamanen e Haveri, 2003; Haveri, 2006).  
The Consolidation versus Fragmentation Debate 
The public choice argument can be traced back to the 1960s when Ostrom, 
Tiebout, and Warren (1961) argued that fragmentation within metropolitan areas could 
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induce competition among local governments so as to generate benefits to citizens able to 
vote with their feet .  This idea, of course, undermines reforms promoting the 
consolidation of local governments, but does not impede cooperation between 
government entities within the metropolitan area.  Instead, these polycentric political 
systems involve multiple centres of decision-making and:   
( ) to the extent that they take each other into account in competitive relationships, 
enter into various contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to 
central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the various political jurisdictions in a 
metropolitan area may function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable 
patterns of interacting behaviour (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961: 831).  
From the perspective of public choice scholars, intergovernmental agreements 
creating regional providers become problematic when they assume a monopoly position, 
even under functional fragmentation.  This type of agreements can sometimes produce 
economies of scale for certain services, but severely limits local citizen choices, generates 
producers that are unresponsive to preference diversity, and services are not provided at 
the least cost (Bish and Warren, 1972).  Hence, territorial fragmentation and functional 
specialization are both needed to expand citizen choices, foster participation, and 
improve service delivery competition.  In practice, public choice scholars downplay the 
argument of scale economies suggested by the political economy literature, since 
fragmentation is thought to generate local governments with optimal size to take 
advantage of diverse economies of scale for the provision of different public goods and 
services (Bish and Ostrom, 1973; Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000).   
Even though fragmentation does not impede cooperation (Ostrom, Tiebout, and 
Warren, 1961; Ostrom, 1973), it may render it more difficult (Carmichael and Midwinter, 
2000).  Critics of public choice theory argue that as the number of local government 
entities increases through fragmentation, transaction costs rise and collective action 
becomes less likely due to the parochial political leadership arising from fragmented units 
of government (Keating, 1995).  Since negative externalities occur between 
municipalities, in the absence of cooperation, significant territorial and functional 
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fragmentation leads to competition that can result in a negative sum game for the region 
as a whole. 
Recently, Oakerson and Parks (1989) have argued that local public economies are 
much more complex than it is usually acknowledged.  In reality, a local public economy 
is characterized by a large number of provision and production units linked by a variety 
of interorganizational arrangements comprising a system of governance (Stephens and 
Wikstrom, 2000).  Hence, we are no longer talking about local governments as single-
units responsible for service provision, but as integrated in a system of multiple units of 
local governance (Bouckaert et al., 2002). This argument opened up the dialogue between 
supporters of local government consolidation and public choice advocates of 
fragmentation, and constitutes the basis for the development of the ICA framework 
(Feiock, 2004).  
Institutional Collective Action: An Alternative Framework 
Recent work by Feiock and colleagues emphasizes the concept of decentralized 
governance as a viable alternative to overcome the opposition between consolidation and 
fragmentation.  If elected officials are able to extract political benefits net of transaction 
costs of developing, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing collective action, they will 
support intergovernmental endeavours (Feiock, 2004; 2007).  The core of the Institutional 
Collective Action (ICA) framework lies in the idea that municipalities can act 
collectively to create a civil society that integrates a region across multiple jurisdictions 
through a web of voluntary agreements and associations and collective choices by 
citizens (Feiock, 2004: 6).  
Transaction Costs Analysis and Cooperative Agreements 
The contribution of transaction costs analysis to the study of intergovernmental 
cooperation lies primarily in the unit of analysis  the formal contract established 
between cooperating entities.  Contracting parties face a series of transaction costs 
associated with bargaining for an agreement under collective action dilemmas.  Formal 
cooperation between local governments will increase if the transaction costs of 
establishing formal agreements are minimized (Feiock, 2007). 
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First, local government officials wishing to engage in voluntary cooperative 
agreements need information about the preferences of all participants in order to select a 
good potential partner that will provide opportunities for mutual gain (Feiock, 2007).  
Historical and geographical proximity help reduce information and coordination costs, 
since local governments will be able to find reliable partners based on prior experiences. 
Second, contracting units have to negotiate the terms of agreement. This division 
problem is a major source of transaction costs and an obstacle to cooperative efforts, 
since the allocation of the benefits and costs of cooperation entails bargaining costs 
(Heckathorn and Maser, 1987).  Services that are harder to quantify tend to be provided 
internally and competitively between municipalities, because this allows local officials to 
control performance, attend to service disruptions, and minimize opportunism.  
Third, local governments establishing voluntary agreements face monitoring and 
enforcement costs.  Contract provisions may include incentives and/or sanctions to avoid 
future defection that can be costly for involved parties.  Ultimately, heterogeneity among 
municipalities is likely to become a barrier to contracting, given that diverging 
preferences act as incentives to defection (Feiock, 2007). 
Finally, local government officials negotiating and signing cooperative 
agreements act as agents of their constituents.  Agency costs surface when the 
preferences of citizens diverge from the preferences of local officials (Feiock, 2002).  
Significant agency costs reduce the likelihood of interlocal agreements because officials 
seeking reelection tend to avoid conflict with constituency preferences.  
Municipalities are selective in terms of both the characteristics of governments 
they choose to cooperate with and the characteristics of the services involved in these 
cooperative endeavours.  Here we are not concerned with the characteristics of the 
services, since the goal is to explain why local governments engage in cooperation rather 
than why they choose specific areas for voluntary agreements.  Still, the number of 
transactions between two contracting agents is relevant to analyse the decision to 
cooperate (Williamson, 1985).  When the number of prior formal agreements between 
any two given governments is high, the transaction costs involved in a new agreement 
remain low and the expected benefits of this contract are high.  These municipalities will 
be able to reach efficient cooperative agreements. 
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Transaction costs analysis underlines the formal contract established by two 
government units and highlights the costs involved in partner selection, coordination and 
negotiation between units, enforcement provisions, and principal-agent dilemmas. The 
emphasis in the formal aspects of cooperation is insufficient to explain the development 
of voluntary agreements, since these are often associated with close ties between 
municipal governments sharing much more than just geographical boundaries and service 
contracts.   
Trust, Networks and Collective Action 
Network theory explains local government agreements as the product of 
governance networks.  Interlocal agreements aim at adopting a collective decision-
making process and resource sharing.  In the network form of association hierarchy is 
absent and replaced by stability and duration of relationships between partners with 
shared interests that go beyond purely market driven goals (Powell, 2004).  Given the 
absence of regional governments in Portugal, the development of networks allows local 
governments to overcome service delivery deficits and create long lasting reciprocal 
patterns of communication and exchange.  Since network development is based on 
informal rules and unwritten incentives and sanctions, they favour the formation of trust 
relationships, which in turn supports the establishment of cooperation between partners as 
identified by Putnam (1993) in the Italian context1.  Prior successful experiences are 
likely to encourage local officials to search for new and more complex ways to 
collaborate, frequently dispensing formal contracting.  The work of Robert Putnam 
emphasizes norms of reciprocity, trust, and civic engagement as ways to build social 
capital, pursue shared interests, and facilitate cooperation (Putnam, 1993).  In addition, 
because trust is a pre-contractual condition, it reduces transaction costs and improves 
economic efficiency (Williamson, 1993). 
Since the focus of our work is the decision to engage in formal agreements with 
neighbouring municipalities, these elements are vital in achieving intergovernmental 
cooperation because past formal and informal agreements shape present decisions to 
                                                
1
 Recent work by Raymond (2006) argues that the role of trust as a factor of cooperation is still under 
dispute. The author finds that, in the absence of trust, institutional mechanisms and political leadership can 
help to overcome collective action obstacles to environmental protection. 
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cooperate.  This argument has been empirically verified in a wide variety of settings.  
These include local government cooperation in rural areas (Lackey et. al., 2002), regional 
economic development in metropolitan areas (Feiock, Tao and Johnson, 2004), and 
disaster and emergency management situations (Kapucu, 2006). 
Networks are equally important because they increase the supply of entrepreneurs 
by reducing the risks and organizational costs of entrepreneurship (Schneider, Teske, and 
Mintrom, 1995: 176).  Political leadership builds consensus and promotes shared goals, 
helping to overcome differences in economic and political resources across 
municipalities.  In the American context, the formation of intergovernmental partnerships 
relies on the activities developed by political entrepreneurs2, such as mayors and city 
council members, as well as, managerial entrepreneurs, including city-managers and 
upper level bureaucrats (Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom, 1995).  A strong, proactive 
leadership is likely to act as a facilitator of cooperative agreements, because policy 
entrepreneurs can reap a large proportion of the benefits provided by successful collective 
action (Feiock, 2004).  These rewards can take several forms, including increased 
reputation, preferred governmental actions, and even money (Niskanen, 1978). 
Local elites wishing to acquire prominence at the regional level are also likely to 
become supporters of intergovernmental cooperation, engaging in the art of heresthetics 
to influence the political agenda (Riker, 1961). This is especially important in the context 
of the European Union, where a regional paradigm of economic development and 
structural adjustment seems to have set in3. Given that structural funds are allocated by 
region, there is an incentive for cooperation to evolve, not only between municipalities, 
but also between these and private and non-profit sector actors. More generally, 
constitutional-level rules are shaping local actors incentives and behaviour, increasing 
the attractiveness of network governance and cooperation (Ostrom, 1990; McCabe and 
Feiock, 2005). 
The efforts of policy entrepreneurs in overcoming collective action problems may 
be dampened by heterogeneity of local government preferences and goals (Feiock, 2007).  
The ICA framework stresses that heterogeneity is a strong adversary of voluntary 
                                                
2 Public choice theory defines a political entrepreneur as an actor who can correct the problem of 
underprovision through the coordination of expectations or coercing contributions (Arce, 2001: 124). 
3
 Since 1988, structural funds administered by the European Commission mandate the use of partnerships. 
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cooperation because when social, demographic, racial and income inequalities prevail 
between neighbouring municipalities within the same metropolitan area, the likelihood of 
successful collaboration is diminished, because constituents will regard these agreements 
with distrust.  Homogeneity decreases transaction costs of intergovernmental agreements 
by emphasizing common interests and preferences among local governments. 
Both in the United States and Europe, regional governments are perceived as 
threats to local autonomy and efforts to establish formal commitments at the regional or 
metropolitan level are frequently faced with strong opposition (Norris, 2001; Basolo, 
2003; Laamanen and Haveri, 2003).  Theory predicts that cooperation will be achieved 
only if local governments are racially and economically homogeneous, because this 
deflects the idea that community self-interest and preferences will be hurt as a result of 
interlocal cooperation (Post, 2004; Feiock, 2007).  
In contrast, Kantor (2006) argues that the Dutch experience indicates that for 
income homogeneous areas  Randstad Holland and Amsterdam Metro  cooperation can 
hardly be regarded as successful, and local fragmentation is the rule.  This suggests that 
some of the factors usually associated with successful cooperation may be country 
specific, which further justifies a probe into the Portuguese experience.  
Intergovernmental Cooperation and Decentralisation: The Portuguese Experience 
Historically, Portugal is best characterized as a unitary and highly centralized 
state and this is certainly true for most of the twentieth century, during a period of close 
to fifty years of dictatorship (1926-1974).  The Democratic Revolution of April 1974 
reinstated democracy and became the first opportunity in over fifty years to promote 
political decentralization to local government authorities.  Walter Opello Jr., a keen 
observer of Portuguese political life and institutions, stressed that administrative 
centralization and inadequate local financial autonomy remained unchanged during the 
first decade after the reinstatement of democracy (Opello Jr., 1981; 1991).  Unfamiliar 
with the practice of democracy, local officials and citizens remained distant from 
participatory democracy and civic engagement. 
National political culture and history are important contextual factors that 
contribute to explain the resistance to decentralised solutions for service delivery and the 
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predominance of centralized public sector-based alternatives.  In countries such as Italy 
and Portugal, characterized by administrative systems in the Napoleonic tradition, 
working for lower levels of government is frequently associated with loss of status and 
prestige (Ongaro, 2006).  This negative view of local government service provision and 
employment combined with a paternalistic relationship towards the central government 
and the State helps to explain the Portuguese scepticism and distrustfulness of the 
introduction of both decentralised service provision and market-oriented solutions.  The 
limited amount of contracting at the local government level for the large majority of 
services is a strong indicator of this resistance to the generalization of New Public 
Management reforms and instruments.   
The extensive decentralisation and devolution of service responsibilities identified 
in other countries, such as France, United Kingdom, and United States in the 1980s 
(Loughlin and Mazey, 1995; Evans and Harding, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2000), and 
more recently in Spain and Italy (Evans and Harding, 1997; Ongaro, 2006), eventually 
found its way to Portugal in the end of the 1990s, starting with the publication of the 
Municipal, Inter-municipal and Regional Corporations Act of 1998 (Law 58/98).  In the 
following year, Law 159/99 established functional areas over which local governments 
can exert authority (see Table I).  This legislation represented a significant increase in 
local government responsibilities, with the resulting financial burden.  
(Table I here)  
Local officials were granted large discretion as far as service delivery options, 
even though they are still limited by financial constraints.  The significant amount of 
intergovernmental grants and the relatively small proportion of local government self-
financing confirm the centralized nature of the Portuguese national government.  The 
average financial dependency of local governments  proportion of transfers from the 
national government to municipalities in total local revenues  is 45.5%, but it ranges 
from 10% to 90%, with a strong negative correlation with the level of economic 
development of the municipality. Transfers to local governments are not earmarked, but 
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the degree of autonomy in setting local tax rates is severely restricted by national 
legislation. 
Local governments have adopted a cautious attitude by creating more flexible, 
single-purpose organisations, within the public sector, called municipal corporations4, 
which in many instances replaced direct service provision by in-house bureaucracies.  
However, prior work shows that only financially autonomous communities are truly able 
to enjoy the economic efficiency gains enabled by these organisational structures 
(Tavares and Camões, 2006; 2007). 
In 2003, a new framework for regionalism and municipal collaboration was 
approved by Prime-Minister José Durão Barroso and the Center-Right coalition 
government, and has been enthusiastically supported by local officials, given the relative 
freedom of association allowed by the enacting legislation.  As in other instances 
elsewhere in Europe, the national level government set the rules under which local 
governments exercise modernisation activities (Wayenberg, 2006).  In contrast with the 
1998 national referendum on the creation of regional governments, the 2003 reform 
provided a flexible set of rules for local government cooperation by encouraging bottom-
up action on the part of local officials and organisations, rather than a top-down design of 
regional governments.   
Law 10/2003 established the rules for the creation of metropolitan governments.  
Great Metropolitan Areas (GAM)5 are multi-purpose government associations that can 
be formed by at least nine municipalities and 350000 inhabitants; Urban Communities 
(ComUrb)6 are a similar type of metropolitan government, but the minimum requirements 
are less stringent (3 municipalities and 150000 inhabitants).  The Metropolitan Areas of 
Lisbon and Porto were created in 1991, but, since the enactment of the new legislation, 
they have expanded their functional service areas and accepted new membership, and 
other types of regional organisations  ComUrb and CI  have also increased 
significantly, involving an ever larger number of municipalities and service areas. 
                                                
4 Municipal corporations are single purpose organisations similar to what the Anglo-Saxon literature 
starting with Gulick (1947) identifies as public authorities. Portuguese municipal corporations are not 
allowed to levy taxes, generally rely on revenues derived from user fees, and are governed by an appointed 
executive board (see also Sbragia 1996; Frant 1997; Bourdeaux 2005; Eger III, 2005). 
5 Grandes Áreas Metropolitanas. 
6 Comunidades Urbanas. 
 13
According to Law 11/2003, Inter-Municipal Communities (CI)7 can be either 
multi-purpose or single-purpose associations, but municipalities belonging to one of the 
former cannot integrate other GAM or ComUrb government.  In addition, local 
governments can participate in more than one single-purpose inter-municipal community, 
also designated as Municipal Associations8.  Contrary to metropolitan area governments 
(GAM and ComUrb), municipal associations tend to be easier to establish and involve a 
smaller number of local governments.  Municipal associations are the dominant type of 
intergovernmental cooperation, showing that communities are more likely to pool their 
efforts to deliver specific services.  
Among the activities developed by municipal associations, the most common are 
solid waste management (29 associations), local economic development (26), water and 
wastewater management (7), and environmental management (5).  There are three 
municipal associations that describe their main activity as developing project 
applications to European Union structural funds .  All the services mentioned are 
consistent with what the literature predicts as primary targets to intergovernmental 
agreements.  Table II presents some descriptive data illustrating the Portuguese local 
intergovernmental cooperation experience.   
(Table II here)  
Several works in the urban literature have argued that regional associations and 
local government agreements are hindered by a desire of local government officials and 
populations to secure local self-rule and political autonomy (Norris, 2001; Basolo, 2003).  
In the Portuguese context, this generic statement has very specific implications.  
The Portuguese Constitution allows for the implementation of regional 
governments.  However, in November 1998, the Socialist government conducted a 
national referendum with the proposal to enact 8 regions.  Results were undermined by 
poor turnout (48.30%) but, nevertheless, showed a clear rejection of the intentions of the 
                                                
7 Comunidades Intermunicipais. 
8 Associações de Municípios. Those familiar with the French experience will recognize in Portuguese 
multi-purpose associations similarities with the SIVOM (Syndicats à Vocation Multiple) and the more 
recent Communautés Urbaines. The Portuguese single-purpose associations are replicas of the French 
SIVU (Syndicats à Vocation Unique). 
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national government to impose a top-down model of regional government (No= 63.51%).  
Portuguese voters regarded this proposal as an attempt by local level officials to promote 
their careers by becoming the leaders of a regional political class.  This perception was 
particularly strong in more urban areas, which contributes to explain the unequivocal 
result of the referendum. 
To further complicate the analysis, the Portuguese local government system is 
characterized by an additional tier of self-government  the freguesia  the smallest unit 
of self-government, reminiscent of the Catholic parishes, with a low number of 
competences and heavily financially dependent on the municipal government.  The 
number of parishes varies significantly between municipalities, from just a few up to 89, 
and their boundaries are contained inside those of the municipal government they belong 
(Silva, 2004)9.  
Both municipalities and parishes have a long-standing historical tradition and, 
despite some attempts at creating intermediate levels of government throughout the last 
two hundred years, they have remained as the symbol of local government social and 
political autonomy (Silva, 2004).  In addition, recent attempts at promoting the 
consolidation of parishes by the national government were faced with strong opposition 
both by the National Association of Parishes and by local populations.  Parishes wishing 
to become municipalities based on their size, population, and/or prior existence as 
municipalities face formal approval by the Portuguese parliament and by President.  
Recent endeavours failed and parish populations demonstrated their anger by refusing to 
vote on national elections. 
The only intermediate level of government that vaguely resembles a regional 
government is the distrito (district).  Formally established in 1835, the 18 districts in 
Continental Portugal cannot be considered a regional level of government since they are 
deconcentrated agents of the central state.  The district governor acts as the representative 
of the national government in the regional district.  Historically, the district capital is the 
most important and populated city in the region. 
                                                
9
 Currently, Continental Portugal, excluding the Azores and Madeira archipelagos, has 278 municipal 
governments and 4047 parishes. 
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All these events show how difficult it is to overcome strong traditions of local 
autonomy and self-government.  Nevertheless, local governments do cooperate and 
overcome collective action problems, as the number of GAM, ComUrb, CI, and MA 
already shown on Table II confirms.  
Hypotheses  
Local governments decide to join inter-local agreements when the anticipated 
benefits exceed the transaction costs of developing, negotiating, and monitoring these 
agreements.  Rather than looking at the individual features of each local government that 
increase the propensity to cooperate, we suggest that the focus should lay on dyadic 
cooperation relations.  In theory, any two given municipalities can engage in formal 
agreements; however, specific political, economic, and demographic characteristics are 
likely to favour or limit the number of agreements that gets crafted. 
The most obvious factor that can influence the decision to cooperate is 
geographical proximity. Portuguese legislation establishes that only adjacent 
municipalities can associate to form GAM, ComUrb, and CI. The only type of 
organisation that does not require the sharing of geographical boundaries is the Municipal 
Association type.  However, a close inspection of descriptive data indicates that the 
number of municipal associations where non-contiguity occurs is rather small (only two 
cases).  Since this is the case, we assume contiguity by excluding these exceptions and 
proceed by analyzing what other factors affect municipal cooperation in service delivery.   
The degree of homogeneity between two communities can be characterized using 
economic and demographic indicators, such as income, financial status, population size, 
and area.  The larger the difference between these components, the less likely it is that 
two communities will engage in cooperation.  Hence, intergovernmental homogeneity 
across jurisdictions signals potential shared interests and service preferences (Feiock, 
2007).   
As an example, the larger the difference in median income the less likely these 
communities are to cooperate, because benefits will appear as less appealing for the 
richer side.  The financial status of prospective partners is thought to have an analogous 
effect. Municipalities heavily dependent on national government grants will explore other 
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forms of accomplishing local goals, including the association with neighbouring 
communities. 
A similar reasoning can be extended to demographic features.  Two small 
neighbouring communities with similar population size, area and density will find it in 
their best interest to cooperate, not only because they are more likely to share several 
personal, professional and recreational activities (Post, 2004), but also because they will 
be able to take advantage of scale economies.  Demographic homogeneity also 
contributes to minimizing political and economic power asymmetries between 
jurisdictions, thereby facilitating the distribution of gains derived from cooperation 
(Feiock, 2007).  Smaller cities are also more prone to cooperation because civic 
participation tends to be higher than that experienced by larger cities.  Oliver (2001) 
found that individuals living in big cities were less likely to contact local officials, attend 
community meetings, or vote in local elections.  With this in mind, we selected four 
variables and indicators to test our homogeneity hypothesis:  
H1.1: Municipalities that have small differences in purchase power capita 
personal income are more likely to cooperate. 
H1.2: Municipalities that have similar population size are more likely to 
cooperate. 
H1.3: Local governments that cover similar land areas are more likely to 
cooperate. 
H1.4: Local governments with similar financial status as measured by their total 
revenues are more likely to cooperate.   
Several arguments in the literature suggest that cities struggling with financial 
difficulties are more likely to collaborate in order to generate additional revenue to 
respond to service needs.  However, Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) argue that the 
relationship between financial status and cooperation may be more complex than the 
economies of scale argument seems to suggest.  In fact, these authors found cooperation 
to be more prevalent at both low and very high levels of local government wealth.  Slack 
revenues in very wealthy communities seem to facilitate innovative experiences in 
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service delivery.  Recent work by LeRoux and Carr (2007) confirms this finding for 
public works service delivery in Michigan.  Hence, according to our financial autonomy 
hypothesis, we expect that:  
H2: As the level of financial autonomy of a city increases, the likelihood of 
cooperation decreases, but at very high levels of autonomy cities will cooperate 
more.  
Although the level of civic participation influences the degree of local 
intergovernmental cooperation, past experience is also an important feature to gauge the 
level of trust and reciprocity.  Because municipal borders tend to be fixed, cooperation 
between neighbouring jurisdictions is more likely, and the degree of uncertainty in 
transactions is minimized through repeated plays, defection is more easily detected, and 
mutual adjustment achieved less costly.  The number of cooperative links and the time 
elapsed since the first cooperative agreement between any pair of jurisdictions can be 
employed as an indicator of credible commitment. They also provide a signal that the 
monitoring problem associated with making and enforcing credible commitments has 
been successfully solved (Ostrom, 1990).  
With a few exceptions, most multi-purpose associations created in Portugal were 
the product of the 2003 legislation.  The establishment of these regional associations were 
less a product of local politics than a response to an opportunity triggered by national 
legislation.  In contrast with their multi-purpose counterparts, single-purpose municipal 
associations had been in existence prior to the 2003 legislative framework.  In fact, some 
were long standing forms of cooperation, created as early as the beginning of the 1980s, 
as part of the drive for local democratisation post-1974.  These long standing cooperative 
practices have helped to develop new agreements over new service areas.   
In our view, this begs the consideration of local partisan politics as one of the 
factors motivating the decision to cooperate.  Local jurisdictions led by local officials 
from the same political party are more likely to cooperate because the transaction costs 
associated with establishing and monitoring intergovernmental agreements and 
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negotiating the division of benefits will be lower.  Hence, based in the trust hypothesis, 
we expect that:  
H3.1: The longer the time elapsed since the first cooperative agreement 
established between two local governments, the larger number of service delivery 
ties these governments are likely to display; 
H3.2: Local governments headed by mayors of the same political party at the time 
of enactment are more likely to have more cooperative agreements.   
The number of parishes in each local government can impose tremendous 
decision-making costs to both the local executive and the legislative branches.  Each 
parish tends to operate as an interest group, lobbying the municipal government for more 
and better services.  Hence, fragmentation occurs not only at the municipal level, but also 
at the parish level, which complicates matters in terms of regional cooperation.  As the 
number of parishes increases, cooperation between any two given municipalities will 
become more difficult, because the number of compromises necessary to reach an 
agreement will also be more complicated to achieve.  Our fragmentation hypothesis 
states that:  
H4: As the number of parishes increases, the likelihood of contracting between 
two governments decreases.  
The district capital is the most relevant city in each district.  Historically, these 
cities have been more populated, socially dynamic, and true engines of local economic 
development.  Due to these historic, geographic and economic reasons, we expect that 
district capitals will display more numerous cooperative links with their neighbours.  The 
same reasons help to understand why cities from the same district are also more inclined 
to cooperate.  
Associated with network theory, the centrality hypothesis argues that:  
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H5.1: District capital cities are more likely to be involved in cooperative 
agreements. 
H5.2: Cities belonging to the same district are more likely to cooperate.   
The fourth section of this article presented our theory, tying it to the literature on 
the determinants of local intergovernmental cooperation.  We began by describing the 
specific context where cooperation takes place  the Portuguese local government system 
 and proceeded by connecting the generic hypotheses developed in the literature to the 
Portuguese case.  Next, we propose a research design to test these hypotheses.  
Research Design  
The explanation of the determinants of municipal associations entails a specific 
research strategy.  Each municipality may voluntarily opt to participate or not in a 
network of cooperation, but obviously it cannot cooperate alone.  Cooperation implies a 
contractual arrangement between, at least, two local government units.  Therefore, the 
focus of analysis should not be placed on individual municipalities but, rather, on 
contractual links.   
This corresponds to analysing all the possible alternatives of cooperation.  As the 
Portuguese experience shows, intergovernmental cooperation usually implies a network 
of more than two units.  Considering the 278 Portuguese municipalities, there are 38503 
possible dyadic combinations.  With groups of three, the number rises to 3542276 
combinations.  Hence, the focus on dyadic relations is just a matter of keeping things 
simple and feasible in terms of empirical testing. A dyadic relationship, corresponding to 
a contractual link between two units, is our unit of analysis (say A  B).  Similar studies 
have been employed in analysing international conflicts (Beck, King, and Zeng, 2000) 
and coalition governments (Martin and Stevenson, 2001).  In all empirical studies, the 
common pattern is the focus on relations between units rather than individual units. 
In this specific case, the research design implies the comparison between 
instances in which cooperation between municipalities occurs (yes=1) and instances 
where cooperation is absent (no=0). The explanations suggested by the hypotheses are 
also framed as characteristics of the relationship, not characteristics of each individual 
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municipality.  Let us consider an example of four municipalities (A, B, C, and D), for 
which we speculate that differences/similarities in income (homogeneity) are the most 
important explanation for cooperation. The data we would need to collect would be on 
the existence of cooperation and some measurement of income (see Table III).  
(Table III here)  
The first column represents all feasible (permitted) dyads, that is, our units of 
analysis. The second column shows the dependent variable, a dichotomous variable 
representing whether or not cooperation occurs. The third column shows the independent 
variable, that is, some characteristic of that relationship. In this case, our hypothesis 
suggests that each observation measures income differences between the units considered 
in that link (Ij  Ii). Of course, a larger set of explanatory variables can be included.   
The next step is the estimation of the model. We estimate two models using 
different dependent variables. The first is a logistic model to estimate the probability of 
cooperation against the probability of non-cooperation and the effects of each 
explanatory variable on that probability. The second is a Poisson model where the 
dependent variable is the total number of cooperative agreements between each pair of 
local governments10. Based on the dependent variables suggested and the hypotheses 
developed in section four, our preliminary model is presented on Table IV.  
(Table IV here)   
As pointed previously, the number of possible dyadic combinations of the 278 
Portuguese municipalities is 38503, which poses serious data-management problems. At 
this point, we follow more workable approach.  We restrict our analysis to cooperation 
between contiguous municipalities.  While we are conscious of the objections to this 
                                                
10
 The major assumption in a Poisson model is that the conditional mean of the distribution equals the 
conditional variance (equidispersion). We are aware that more often than not, the variance exceeds the 
mean (overdispersion) so that the Poisson model is no longer adequate.  Then, the first step in determining 
the appropriateness of this model is to test for overdispersion (Long 1997; Green 1997). The goodness-of-
fit 2 test does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the data are Poisson distributed, so a Poisson 
regression model is used in the estimation. 
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conservative strategy, namely some problems of selection bias, we are also convinced 
that it does not invalidate the main results.  When non-contiguity is excluded and only 
cooperation between contiguous municipalities is assumed, the total number of dyadic 
relations drops to less than 1000.  Therefore we work with 719 units of observation.    
Findings 
This research aimed at exploring the factors that determine local government 
cooperation in service provision among Portuguese municipalities. We reviewed the 
literature explaining horizontal intergovernmental cooperation and derived and tested a 
series of hypotheses using a research design previously employed in two subfields of 
political science, but never used in the context of public administration research.  Table V 
presents the results for our logistic regression model estimated by maximum likelihood.  
Table VI presents a Poisson regression model where the dependent variable is the count 
of cooperative agreements between each pair of local governments. Both models employ 
similar specifications. The only difference between specifications is the inclusion of a 
quadratic variable  total revenues squared  to test the financial autonomy hypothesis.     
(Tables V and VI here)  
To illustrate the numerical interpretation of the results, Table VII shows the 
computation of what Scott Long (1997) calls factor changes.  They are derived from the 
Poisson regression model shown in Table VI.   Simply put, a factor change means that, 
holding all variables constant, for a unit change in a given independent variable Xk, the 
output count changes by a factor of exp(Bk) (Long 1997: 225).  This factor has an 
important advantage when it comes to interpret the results.  Contrary to what happens 
with the standard Poisson coefficients, the factor changes do not depend on the level of 
the variable of interest or all other variables in the model.      
(Table VII here)  
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To illustrate, the factor change attached to the variable measuring trust based on 
partisanship is 1.15.  This means that the existence of two mayors that belong to the same 
party is expected to increase15%, on average, the number of associations. Conversely, a 
factor change of 0.99 in the variable parishes means a decrease. On average, it means that 
an increase, on average, in the number of parishes decreases by 1% the number of 
cooperative ties.  
On the substantive side, although the results seem to confirm four out of five 
hypotheses, we argue that it is still too soon to reach definitive conclusions.  It seems that 
political trust plays an important role in the decision to cooperate.  If two mayors in 
neighbouring jurisdictions belong to the same political party they are more likely to 
cooperate, because the transaction costs of establishing and monitoring an agreement are 
minimized.  Although we were not able to statistically test the idea that the time elapsed 
since the first collaborative effort increases the number of cooperative agreements 
between any pair of municipalities, we are still confident that this is a strong predictor of 
cooperation.  
The most compelling evidence regards the centrality hypothesis derived from 
network theory.  Local governments cooperate more with cities that belong to the same 
district, and district capitals attract more cooperative endeavours.  District capitals seem 
to play an important role of centrality within each network of cooperative engagements.  
Historic, geographic and economic reasons help to explain this result and this suggests 
that, when a given municipality is considering cooperation with one of its neighbours, it 
will most likely prefer a district capital (if one is available) due to the dynamic associated 
with these cities.  The distritos still represent a powerful constraint in the choice 
regarding cooperative efforts.  Cities prefer to cooperate with other cities from the same 
district rather than with cities from neighbouring districts.  
The division of Portuguese local governments in smaller units called freguesias, a 
reminiscence of the Catholic parishes, complicates the decision to cooperate.  Because 
parishes act as an interest group, increasing decision-making costs to both the local 
executive and legislative branches, it becomes harder to reach cooperative agreements 
between municipalities.  The amount of concessions needed increases with the number of 
parishes, making cooperative agreements much more difficult and lengthy to negotiate.  
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Ultimately, cooperation between any pair of local governments may be doomed to failure 
because local officials prefer to please their parish counterparts and electoral constituents 
rather than enter into uncertain cooperative agreements.  
Finally, we find some evidence that corroborates the financial autonomy 
hypothesis.  Our results confirm the findings of Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) and 
LeRoux and Carr (2007). As the level of financial autonomy of a pair of municipalities 
increases, the likelihood of these cities will cooperate decreases. However, at very high 
levels of financial autonomy, slack revenues allow for new experiences in cooperation.  
Discussion and Directions for Future Research 
This paper shows that what explains individual choices can be very different of 
what explains intergovernmental trust.  More individualistic and more cooperative 
approaches are adopted in different contexts.  A large amount of work needs to be done 
to fit this puzzle of the diversity of services provided at the local level and the 
explanation of the different patterns of choice of public governance structures. At least 
two main steps follow in our research agenda.   
One direction is to extend the present study to all or near all the possible dyadic 
relationships.  The issue previously raised with regard to selection bias need to be 
addressed explicitly.  Some of the mixed or irrelevant findings can then be checked and 
the significant ones made more robust, so we believe.   
The other direction is less methodological and more substantive.  It is to 
investigate the municipal associations themselves. We have already studied 
municipalities and their choices as units of analysis as well as the relationships between 
municipalities.  In the present paper we assumed to study associations by studying the 
binary cooperative ties.  But this is still a fiction because municipal associations are more 
than a simple sum of binary ties.  They are independent organizations, even from a legal 
standpoint.  Therefore a study taking the associations as units is necessary.  As shown in 
Table II, the number of different voluntary associative is large enough to allow 
comparative findings.     
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Table I. Functional Areas Assigned to Local Governments by Law 159/99 
Economic Development 
Recreation and Sports  
Property, Culture and Science 
Parks, Landscaping, and Building Maintenance 
Environment, Water Supply, and Solid Waste Management 
Parking, Transportation and Communications 
Social Housing 
Urban Policy and Land Use Management 
Energy 
Health 
Education 
Social Welfare, Day-Care and Elderly Equipment 
Consumer Protection 
Emergency Management 
Municipal Police 
Foreign Cooperation 
 
Table II. Local Intergovernmental Cooperation in Portugal  
Frequency Average Number 
of Municipalities 
Average 
Population 
Average Area 
(km2) 
Great Metropolitan Areas (GAM) (*) 7 15.6 928434 3152 
Urban Communities (ComUrb) (*) 14 10.6 230788 4366 
Inter-Municipal Communities (CI) (*) 3 8.3 76619 2590 
Municipal Associations (**) 81 8.6 297989 3790 
(*) All GAM, ComUrb, and CI are multi-purpose forms of cooperation and require contiguity between 
members; 
(**) All municipal associations are single-purpose forms of cooperation and most were formed prior to 
2003, but the framework applies to them as well; contiguity is not required. 
Source: National Association of Municipalities   
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Table III. Example of Dyads 
Unit of Analysis Dependent Variable:  
Cooperation 
Independent Variable:  
Income Homogeneity 
A  B 0 IA  IB 
A  C 0 IA  IC 
A  D 1 IA ID 
B  C 0 IB  IC 
B  D 1 IB  ID 
C  D 1 IC  ID 
   
Table IV. Variable Measurement and Hypotheses 
Variable Hypothesis Measure of dyadic relationship Expect Sign 
Purchase Power Homogeneity Difference in purchase power measured as a % of 
national purchase power 
(-) 
Population Homogeneity Difference in Population Size (-) 
Area Homogeneity Difference in Area (-) 
Municipal 
Revenues 
Homogeneity Difference in total revenues per capita (-) 
Financial 
Autonomy 
Financial 
Autonomy 
Financial autonomy measured as the sum of total 
revenues per capita 
(+)  
(Nonlinear) 
Partisanship Trust Same political party at time of enactment 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
(+) 
Length of 
Relationship 
Trust Number of years elapsed since first formal 
agreement 
(+) 
Parishes Fragmentation Total number of parishes (-) 
District Capital Centrality One of the municipalities is a district capital 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
(+) 
District Cities Centrality Both cities belong to the same district (1=Yes; 
0=No) 
(+) 
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Table V. Results of the Logistic Regression Model  
Specification 1 Specification 2 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Purchase Power -.008 .007 -.008 .007 
Population .000 .000 .000 .000 
Area -.0003 .0004 -.0001 .0004 
Revenue Homogeneity -.001*** .0004 -.001*** .0004 
Financial Autonomy .002*** .0004 ---- ---- 
Financial Autonomy(Sq.) ---- ---- .000*** .000 
Partisanship .410** .194 .400** .193 
Parishes -.011** .004 -.012** .004 
District Capital .867** .383 .870** .386 
District Cities 1.882*** .200 1.861*** .198 
Constant -1.126*** .421 -.173 .292 
    
Num. Obs. 719 719 
LR chi2 (9) 143.19 136.27 
Prob > chi2 .0000 .0000 
Pseudo R2 .1737 .1653 
Log-L -340.498 -343.958 
* p < .10  ** p < .05  *** p < .01  
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Table VI. Results of the Poisson Regression Model  
Specification 1 Specification 2 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Power of Purchase -.003 .003 -.002 .003 
Population .000 .000 .000 .000 
Area .000 .000 .000 .000 
Revenue Homogeneity -.0002 .0001 -.000 .000 
Financial Autonomy .000*** .000 ---- ---- 
Financial Autonomy(Sq.) ---- ---- .000* .000 
Partisanship .140** .070 .138** .070 
Parishes -.004** .002 -.004** .002 
District Capital -.068 .126 -.074 .126 
District Cities .838*** .099 .841*** .099 
Constant -.727*** .161 -.529*** .132 
    
Num Obs.  719 719 
LR chi2 (9) 112.56 108.51 
Prob > chi2 .0000 .0000 
Pseudo R2 .0586 .0565 
Log-L -904.725 -906.747 
* p < .10  ** p < .05  *** p < .01.      
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Table VII. Factor Changes of the Poisson Regression Model  
Specification 1 Specification 2 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Power of Purchase .997 .003 .998 .003  
Population 1.000 1.01e-06    1.000 1.00e-06      
Area 1.000 .000  1.000 .000 
Revenue Homogeneity .999 .000 .999 .000 
Financial Autonomy 1.000 .000  ------ ------- 
Financial Autonomy(Sq.) ------- ------- 1 4.96e-08    
Partisanship 1.150 .081  1.148 .080 
Parishes .996 .002  .996 .002 
District Capital .934 .118 .929 .117 
District Cities 2.313 .228 2.319 .229 
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